

Why America Needs a Sufficient F/A-22 Force

- **Background:** The USAF wartime requirement accepted by OSD in the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) called for **381** F/A-22s—240 combat coded F/A-22s spread over 10 Air Expeditionary Forces, plus attrition, test and training aircraft. The PBD in the proposed FY2006 budget results in only **180** F/A-22s—less than half of the USAF requirement!
- This decision results in no savings until FY09. Therefore, we urge reversal of this decision until completion of classified QDR analysis, involving uniformed military leadership, rather than presupposing the results of QDR analysis.
- The Air Force will not be able to guarantee Air Superiority in the 21st Century without a sufficient quantity of F/A-22s—many developing and near-peer nations are modernizing their air forces and air defenses now!
- We should proceed with the Air Force's stated #1 combat modernization priority—our nation invested nearly \$30B in R&D to develop the world's finest Air Dominance fighter—we must buy in quantities that pay back this investment!
 - Cutting the last \$11B (15%) out of the planned \$72B investment eliminates the least expensive and yet most capable 100 a/c (36%) of the envisioned initial 277 a/c buy.
 - A small, token force of revolutionary F/A-22s encourages, rather than discourages, potential adversaries to invest more in airpower and advanced SAMs. The perception that a small Raptor force could be overwhelmed with numbers encourages adversary investment.
- Buying only 180 F/A-22s creates another B-2 like “Low Density, High Demand” force, inadequate to meet anything other than a SINGLE small regional conflict.
 - Desert Storm, the last major integrated Air War, with over 40 allied a/c lost, used well over 200 Air Superiority F-15C and F-1 Tornado fighters—and our force size then afforded at least 300 in reserve to counter any Korean threat.
- While the Air-to-Ground optimized JSF is the essential key to an affordable, persistent multi-role strike force, the future joint force solution requires sufficient numbers of both F/A-22 and JSF. The Air Dominance optimized F/A-22 flies much higher, much faster, and has enhanced survivability and lethality against advanced Air-to-Air and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) threats.
- Previous Presidential administrations and Congresses funded future fighter modernization R&D in lieu of procurement. Now this administration has decided to terminate that long overdue modernization procurement—just as the Raptor is proving the \$30B in R&D money was well spent. Imagine developing a cure for cancer and then not buying the medicine.

- OSD, without the benefit of strategic analysis and contrary to military advice, is killing both adequate long-term quantities and capabilities, as well as operational readiness—based on the fallacy that all future wars will be similar to the last war.
 - Future wars will most assuredly prove that Air Dominance is required, not desired. Paying for Air Dominance without sufficient F/A-22s will cost us lost lives and aircraft.
 - OSD analysts in the late 1940's used similar fallacious arguments to gut conventional force investment, with the rationale that future wars would be nuclear, rendering conventional air and land power unnecessary. That strategy eroded our conventional readiness and proved deadly to over 36,000 Americans in the Korean War.

- 2004's "Cope India" Exercise reinforced previous Air Force cautions that other nations now possess fighters that are at technological parity with current U.S. air superiority and multi-role aircraft. The F/A-22 regains our 20-30 year national advantage in the air—failing to purchase adequate quantities abandons much of that advantage.
 - According to open sources:
 - Many nations are buying and even building hundreds of advanced Flanker variant fighters—equivalent or superior to the F-15!
 - Many nations are buying multiple advanced SAMs that can easily target and kill our current non-stealth fighters.
 - Non-stealth aircraft simply will not survive 2010+ SAM engagement.
 - Fighting new foreign threats in 2010 with 30 year old F-15s, F-16s, and F-18 designs relives our previous historical mistakes—
 - **1941:** Fighting Zeros and Me-109s in with the outclassed P-38s, P-39s, and P-40s. The P-51 arrived late after many fighters, bombers and pilots/crews were lost.
 - **1950:** Fighting the unanticipated new MiG-15 with obsolete P-51s and P-80s. The F-86 arrived late and dramatically turned the tide.

- Calling the F/A-22 a "Cold War relic" is as uninformed as saying that about the HH-60 Blackhawk, M-16 rifle or Nimitz carrier. The fact is, the overwhelming majority of modern weapons are required in war, whether that war is against a large conventional or a small unconventional adversary, in order to leverage maximum possible advantage from the air, sea and land.
 - Russian fighter exporters have claimed their next fighter will be in the JSF's capability class—making the clearly Air Dominant F/A-22 even more essential to reasserting our national advantage in aerospace.

- 1120 F/A-22 suppliers in 44 states contain 40,000 jobs that are crucial to the health of the cutting edge U.S. Aerospace Industrial Base. These suppliers will earn over \$44B in past and future F/A-22 revenue.